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By JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI AND ANNE O. KRUEGER* 
For the past three years, the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
has been sponsoring a research pro-
ject on exchange control, liberalization, 
and economic development. In this pro-
ject, a number of country studies have 
been undertaken, focusing upon the quan-
tification and analysis of individual de-
veloping countries' experiences with ex-
change control regimes and attempts at 
liberalizing those regimes, focusing equally 
on the interaction between the country's 
trade and payments regime and its eco-
nomic development. 
The countries studied have included 
Brazil (A. Fishlow), Chile (J. Behrman), 
Colombia (C. Diaz-Alejandro), Egypt 
(B. Hansen), Ghana (C. Leith), India 
(J. Bhagwati and T. N: Srinivasan), Israel 
(M. Michaely), South Korea (C. Frank, 
Jr.), the Philippines (R. Baldwin)' and 
Turkey (A. Krueger). Each study has been 
undertaken within an analytical frame-
work devised by us and agreed upon in 
advance by all participants. These studies 
are now completed or nearly so, and they 
are to be published by the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research through 1973 
and 1974. They should be of interest to 
students of the individual countries as 
well as to those concerned with trade and 
development issues more generally. When 
all the studies are final, we shall have a 
great deal of material for analysis on a 
comparable basis of different coun,tries' 
experiences. . 
• Professors of economics at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and the University of Minnesota, respec-
tively. 
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The final stage of the NBER project 
consists of our attempt to synthesize the 
results of the individual studies in an 
overall volume. This paper represents a 
preliminary report on some of these re-
sults. We therefore present an overview of 
some of the major topics in Section 1. In 
Section II, some of the more detailed re-
sults pertaining to the effects of exchange 
control regimes are presented. 
I. An Overview 
For each country covered by the Bureau 
project, individual researchers were asked 
to trace their country's experience with a 
view to identifying: (1) when and why ex-
change control was adopted, and how the 
control regime was intended to relate to 
the country's domestic economic goals; 
(2) the evolution of quantitative restric-
tions after their initial imposition; (3) ef-
forts, if any, to ameliorate the undesired 
results of the payments regime; (4) experi-
ences with attempts at liberalization and 
the timing of the economy's response to 
those attempts; and (5) the resource-
allocational, income-distributional, and 
growth effects of the country's experience. 
Within that framework, each country's 
author singled out for in-depth analysis a 
particular point in time during which the 
detailed working of the exchange-control 
regime was analyzed, and selected one 
liberalization effort for intensive analysis. 
On the basis of the results from indi-
vidual studies to date, we have been sur-
prised at the degree of similarity among 
seemingly diverse countries. On each topic, 
certain broad conclusions have emerged. 
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Motivation for Quantitative Restrictions 
(QR)-Regimes 
Initial adoption of exchange controls 
was generally an ad hoc response to ex-
ternal events. Rapidly, however, quanti-
tative restrictions were perceived as a 
means of furthering domestic industrializa-
tion policies. Whether it was the rapid 
shift in international market conditions 
during the 1952-1954 period or memories 
of the Great Depression, most policy 
makers were pessimistic-probably to an 
objectively unwarranted degree-about 
prospects for growth through industriali-
zation based upon export growth and 
diversification. The optimal resource allo-
cation dictum-that the marginal cost of 
earning foreign exchange should be 
equated with the marginal cost of saving 
foreign exchange-was generally aban-
doned in favor of saving foreign exchange 
at all costs. 
In the process of using exchange control 
to foster the growth of domestic industry, 
however, the internal working of the QR 
s~stems generally frustrated, at least par-
tIally, the very domestic goals they were 
designed to achieve. Bureaucratic alloca-
tional procedures, political pressures sur-
rounding the administration of controls 
and the private sector response to the un~ 
intended incentives created by the re-
gimes led to frustration of the goals the 
QR regimes were designed to serve. We 
shall return to more detailed examination 
of the logic of QR systems in Section II. 
Export Promotion Versus 
Import Substitution 
Among the more interesting results that 
appear to emerge from our preliminary 
analysis of individual countries' experience 
is .that countries which have had export-
orIented development strategies appear, 
by and large, to have intervened virtually 
as much and as "chaotically" on the side 
of promoting new exports as other coun-
tries have on the side of import substitu-
tion. Yet, the economic cost of incentives 
distorted toward export promotion appears 
to have been less than the cost of those 
distorted toward import substitution, and 
the growth performance of the countries 
oriented toward export promotion appears 
to have been more satisfactory than that 
of the import-substitution oriented coun-
tries. If that conclusion is valid, the lesson 
is that policy should err on the side of al-
lowing a higher marginal cost for earning 
than for saving foreign exchange. 
There are several theoretical reasons 
which would explain such an asymmetry 
in outcomes, and the empirical evidence 
does point in their direction. In theory, 
there are four reasons why export promo-
tion may be the superior strategy. 
(1) Generally speaking, the costs of ex-
cess export promotion are more visible to 
policymakers than are those of import sub-
stitution. If there are departures from 
unified exchange rates, export-promoting 
growth can be sustained only by subsidies 
or other incentives costly to the govern-
ment budget. Thus, there are built-in 
forces within the government against ex-
cessive export subsidization and promo-
tion. The equivalent costs of import sub-
stitution are borne by firms and consu-
mers and, hence, no obvious intragovern-
mental pressure group emerges as rapidly 
when incentives are biased toward import 
substitution. 
(2) An export-oriented development 
strategy generally entails relatively greater 
use of indirect, rather than direct, inter-
ventions. There is considerable evidence 
from the individual country studies that 
direct intervention may be considerably 
more costly than is generally recognized 
(see Section II below) . When policy 
makers are concerned with export promo-
tion, direct controls cannot be as per-
vasive as they can be under import sub-
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stitution. Price controls, distribution con-
trols, and a host of other detailed inter-
ventions make little sense, even to bureau-
crats, when firms' outputs are intended 
largely for overseas markets, but appear 
attractive when production is oriented 
toward the home market under import 
substitution. The fact that, under import 
substitution, government officials have 
power to remove or enhance domestic 
monopoly positions of import-competing 
firms implies that those firms can be in-
duced to accept otherwise intolerable (and 
socially unprofitable) interventions with 
their decisions. By contrast, officials sim-
ply do not have the same degree of power 
over firms engaged primarily in the export 
market. 
(3) Exporting firms, however much 
they may be sheltered on the domestic 
market, must face price and quality com-
petition in international markets. Import-
substituting producers, with no competi-
tion for domestic markets, are a pervasive 
fact of life in the developing countries 
where import substitution has been 
stressed. While there is little hard evidence 
on the subject, there is considerable reason 
to believe that sheltered monopoly posi-
tions may be important explanations of 
low productivity growth in the newly es-
tablished manufacturing industries in de-
veloping countries. Insofar as the adverse 
side effects of inadequate competition are 
less severe under the export-oriented 
strategy, it may be that export promotion 
is superior simply because it reduces the 
incidence of the problem. 
(4) If there are significant indivisibili-
ties or economies of scale, an export-
oriented strategy will enable firms of 
adequate size to realize them. When im-
port-substituting incentives dominate the 
domestic market, import-substituting 
firms generally are confronted with power-
ful incentives for expansion through di-
versification; each new product line pro-
vides one more domestic monopoly posi-
tion. If indivisibilities and/or economies 
to scale are important, an export-oriented 
strategy will provide better incentives for 
expansion of capacity in existing lines. As 
such, an export-oriented growth strategy 
is better suited to achieving whatever 
economies of scale are present than is an 
import-substitution strategy where firms 
are generally limited in their horizons by 
the size of the domestic market. 
These and other arguments supporting 
the case for an asymmetrical behavior of 
the export-promoting versus import-sub-
stituting economies appear to be borne out 
by the contrast in the success of South 
Korea and the relative failure of India, for 
example, in the countries studied in the 
project. Since approximately 1960, the 
economic policies of South Korea have 
been heavily oriented toward growth 
through exporting. The rate of growth of 
exports has been almost double that of 
real GNP. Close inspection of South 
Korean policies indicates that the kinds of 
detailed and chaotic interventions which 
we have found in other countries are abun-
dantly present in Korea's case as well: 
numerous QR's, high tariffs, and physical 
targeting of exports and imports. The 
striking difference, however, is in the re-
markable degree to which the government 
has been willing to use exchange-rate 
changes and to lean in favor of export pro-
motion via preferential allocation of import 
licenses, etc. Thus, aside from other special 
factors, such as the high inflow of foreign 
resources (official and private), the one 
striking aspect of Korean success has 
clearly been the significantly less discrimi-
nation against exports than in other de-
veloping countries, and not (it would ap-
pear) the presence of a neoc1assically effi-
cient allocation mechanism in toto in the 
system. 
Whether this asymmetry between ex-
port promotion and import substitution is 
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important or not awaits further explora-
tion as the final results of the country 
studies emerge. What is clear is that, of the 
countries which have stressed export pro-
motion, none have been free from inter-
ventions of the type that economists gen-
erally identify with QR regimes and im-
port-substitution strategies, and that the 
export-promotion strategies generally ap-
pear to have higher payoffs. 
Nominal Versus EiJective Devaluation 
Export rebates, tariffs, surcharges, im-
port entitlement schemes, and a host of 
other devices are generally employed un-
der QR regimes, and they lead to a wide 
dispersion in effective exchange rates (the 
amount of domestic currency paid when a 
good is landed per dollar of c.i.f. value) by 
commodity categories. Moreover, the in-
creasing resort to changes in surcharges 
and export subsidies and to alterations in 
effective exchange rates means that, even 
without a formal devaluation, there are 
many degrees of partial devaluation in 
QR regimes. 
Usually, formal devaluation is accom-
panied by the partial or total removal of 
export incentives and surcharges upon im-
ports. The result is that changes in the 
parity, as reported by the International 
Monetary Fund, do not necessarily pro-
vide a good indication of the economically 
relevant magnitude of the devaluation. 
Thus, in Egypt, Bent Hansen's study 
shows that the 1962 devaluation was little 
more than a tidying up operation: compli-
cated export bonuses and import charges 
were replaced by across-the-board mea-
sures, so that the average local currency 
payments and receipts per dollar of inter-
national transactions increased by only 
one-fourth the amount of nominal devalu-
ation. For Chile, Jere Behrman's study 
shows effective devaluations to be about 
two-thirds the nominal ones in 1959 and 
1963. By contrast, when Chile adopted 
frequent exchange-rate adjustments in the 
late 1960's, the effective devaluations 
slightly exceeded the nominal, although 
real devaluation was much smaller. 
Determinants of Success of Liberalization 
Because of the significant differences in 
practice betwe~n nominal and effective 
devaluation, we believe that it is impor-
tant, under QR-regimes, to distinguish 
between devaluation and liberalization. 
Liberalization may be said to occur 
when the official price of foreign exchange 
assumes an increased role in the allocation 
of resources, whereas devaluation occurs 
whenever nominal exchange rates are al-
tered. Thus, as illustrated by Egypt's 
1962 episode, it is possible to have a 
devaluation in which the altered nominal 
price of foreign exchange has little or no 
effect on resource allocation, and quantita-
tive restrictions and other direct interven-
tions maintain their importance as alloca-
tive instruments. In other cases, such as 
the Turkish devaluation of 1958 and the 
Indian devaluation of 1966, the devalua-
tions more than offset the reductions and 
removals of surcharges, taxes, and export 
premia. In those circumstances, the official 
price of foreign exchange increased in im-
portance as an allocator of scarce foreign 
exchange, at least in the short run. 
The difference between nominal and 
effective devaluations has the important 
effect that, as happened with the 1966 
Indian devaluation, the criteria by which 
the devaluation is judged are typically 
confused; and the "rationalization" im-
plicit in shifting from a de facto to a de jure 
devaluation (resulting in no effective de-
valuation) is ignored and the nominal 
devaluation is assessed as though it was 
also the effective devaluation. 
The studies also point up a number of 
interesting conclusions regarding the like-
lihood of effective devaluations leading to 
continued increases in the allocative func-
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tion of the price of foreign exchange. A few 
vignettes are worth pointing out here. (1) 
Starting from the long exposure to auto-
matic protection under the QR-regime, few 
industries will accept the consequence of 
effective devaluation and reduced reliance 
on QR's; namely, the need to compete or 
contract. As Michaely's study of Israel 
and the Bhagwati-Srinivasan analysis of 
the 1966 Indian episode show clearly, 
liberalization works only insofar as im-
ports of noncompetitive goods are in-
volved, and the degree of protection to 
import-using industries may even increase 
as imported intermediates get liberalized. 
(2) The effect of liberalization is often to 
induce a recessionary tendency rather than 
the traditionally feared inflationary im-
pact. The re.:essionary impact follows 
from governments typically trying to con-
tract monetary and fiscal policy, while ig-
noring the fact that the devaluation itself 
sets up endogenous recessionary tenden-
cies. These come from several sources: (a.) 
the excess of imports over exports, thanks 
to influx of aid and private capital, itself 
implies deflation with devaluation; (b.) the 
increased imports of materials can lead to 
increased output and lowered profit mar-
gins and may adversely affect investment 
in the import-competing activities whereas 
the exporters may not push up investment 
in time because they expect the increased 
export incentives to be neutralized or the 
system remains so loaded against exports 
that exporters find it difficult to increase 
their investments sufficiently; and (c.) as 
in Turkey, the initial effect of an effective 
devaluation seems at times to be to reduce 
construction activity, with adverse effects 
(at least in the short run) on employment 
and income. 
Payments Regimes and Economic Growth 
The determinants of a developing coun-
try's overall growth rate are numerous, 
and the payments regime is only one such 
factor. The interaction between the pay-
ments regime and economic growth is com-
plex and depends upon a host of other fac-
tors in individual countries. 
That the effects of the payments regime 
on growth cannot be analyzed without 
regard to other aspects of the domestic 
economy cannot be stressed enough. Clark 
Leith's findings on Ghana provide a good 
illustration. Its major export, cocoa, is al-
most unaffected by the payments regime 
directly. The price paid to producers is 
determined by the Cocoa Board and is in-
dependent of the exchange rate. On the 
import side, government control over 
credit allocation under credit rationing, 
combined with severe capital market im-
perfections, means that the demand for 
imports is more a function of government 
policies in the credit market than it is of 
the price of foreign exchange. All new in-
vestment projects must be approved by 
the government, which has power to grant 
or withhold subsidies and other privileges 
large enough to make the difference be-
tween profit and loss on virtually all in-
vestment projects. Under such circum-
stances, it would be folly to analyze the 
payments regime as if entrepreneurs were 
responding in perfect markets to price sig-
nals alone. This is not to say that the pay-
ments regime does not have its own effects 
upon resource allocation and growth, but 
rather that analysis of those effects is con-
siderably more complex than is generally 
assumed. The individual country studies 
and our forthcoming synthesis explore 
these interactions in some detail. 
II. The Anatomy of Quantitative 
Restrictions 
Tariffs Versus Quotas 
It is always true that every quota has a 
nonnegative tariff equivalent at each point 
in time for every recipient of an import 
license. However, it is not always the case 
that there is a single tariff-equivalent for a 
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quota for a given homogeneous import 
commodity, and it is generally false that 
the resource-allocational effects of a quota 
are the same as those of the tariff-equiva-
lent even when there is a single tariff-
equivalent. 
The reason why there may not be a sin-
gle tariff-equivalent for the import of a 
homogeneous commodity is that resale of 
imports is often illegal. In that case, there 
is no reason to expect a common implicit 
domestic price in the absence of a perfect 
and costless black market. Thus, the cri-
teria for allocation and the actual detailed 
bureaucratic decisions as to who should 
receive an import license, and how much 
each should receive, will in general affect 
resource allocation. 
Even when there is a single domestic 
price for the imported good, the method of 
license allocation makes an important 
difference to resource allocation and in-
come distribution. It is useful to think of 
the differences between the c.i.f. price of 
the good (at the nominal exchange rate) 
and the domestic price as consisting of two 
parts: (1) the duties, surcharges, and other 
costs of landing paid by the actual im-
porter, including his normal costs of fore-
gone interest, handling, and so on; and (2) 
the premium accruing to the recipient of 
the import license. The local currency cost 
of the c.i.f. import plus the first item equals 
landed cost. Landed cost in local currency 
divided by the c.i.f. price in foreign cur-
rency equals the effective exchange rate. 
Landed cost is then the price that would 
prevail in the domestic market if there 
were no QR's upon the import. The pre-
mium, therefore, is the windfall gain ac-
cruing to the recipient of an import license. 
The precise allocation of import licenses 
makes for important differences because it 
determines who will receive the premium; 
we note two here. (1) If licenses for inter-
mediate goods imports are allocated di-
rectly to producers, these producers are 
implicitly being subsidized in their produc-
tion process. A devaluation would increase 
the costs of the manufacturers using the 
intermediate good. If, however, licenses 
are allocated to importers who then resell 
to the manufacturers, the premium ac-
crues to the importers. If devaluation is 
then carried out, there will be no effect on 
manufacturers' costs unless the size of the 
devaluation exceeds the size of the pre-
mium. (2) The calculation of effective pro-
tection again must allow for the fact that 
some imports would be obtained directly 
by producers at premium-exclusive prices 
and others at premium-inclusive prices. 
The resulting estimates of protection can 
be significantly different than if no adjust-
ment was made for the indirect allocation 
of imports of intermediates to producers, 
as illustrated for example by the Bhag-
wati-Srinivasan study of India. 
That the distinction between premium 
and landed cost is important can be seen 
by inspection of Turkish data for 1968 
presented in Krueger's study. At an official 
exchange rate of TL 9=$1, it appeared 
that the average landed cost of $1 of im-
ports was T L 23.8 and the premium was 
TL 23.1. 
Logic of QR's 
Once a QR regime is established, it 
seems to have an internal, self-contradic-
tory logic all its own. The tariff equivalent 
of existing quotas tends to fluctuate widely 
and the unintended side effects of QR's 
tend to force other changes. Decision 
makers do not receive visible feedbacks as 
to the effects of their actions. Thus, one 
finds quota categories where the quotas 
are redundant and there is a zero premium 
side by side with quota applications ex-
ceeding the amount of the quota by ex-
orbitant multiples. Yet these multiples 
provide little information to those allocat-
ing quotas, because the amount of applica-
tions is itself influenced by expectations as 
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to the probable disparity between the 
amount applied for and the amount re-
ceived. 
Bu t that is only a small part of the 
story. For, once a QR regime is established, 
quotas inevitably become a tool seized 
upon by governments to accomplish a host 
of purposes other than the initial one of 
restraining ex ante payments imbalances. 
Thus, "priorities" are established and 
preferential treatment is given to appli-
cants willing to further an officially desired 
goal. For example, efforts are generally 
made to encourage capital goods imports 
at the expense of consumer goods imports, 
in the hope of accelerating the rate of in-
vestment. In turn, the newly established 
manufacturing capacity often has inter-
mediate goods import "requirements" 
which can be met only at the cost of reduc-
ing capital goods imports, thus defeating 
the initial purpose of the priority. More-
over, in increasing capital goods imports, 
consumer goods imports are the first to go, 
and the production structure of the do-
mestic economy becomes increasingly or-
iented toward consumer goods. 
Once that happens, growth in invest-
ment becomes increasingly dependent 
upon expansion of imports, itself a func-
tion of export growth. Yet the protection 
afforded to producers in domestic markets 
by QR's is so great that profitability lies in 
expanding domestic sales and disincentives 
to export increase. By this point, govern-
ments are trapped: if they devalue the 
currency (which could have been done in 
the first place as an alternative to QR's), 
they fear that the rate of capital formation 
will decline as capital goods become more 
expensive. If they do not devalue the cur-
rency, they must resort to ad hoc measures 
such as export rebates, import entitlement 
schemes for exporters, and the like in order 
to stimulate export growth. As these "in-
centives" grow over time, the regime be-
comes increasingly piecemeal. In virtually 
all the countries studied in the project 
which have had QR systems, governments 
themselves have reacted against these un-
desired side effects and proliferation of 
special regulations that seem to result from 
QR systems. 
The tendency toward increasingly de-
tailed, often internally inconsistent, con-
trols and the resulting frustration of initial 
intentions shows up in numerous ways. In 
India, a major goal was the reduction of 
concentration in economic power, which 
presumably meant reducing the share of 
the large industrial concerns in industrial 
output. Yet the regulations and proce-
dures surrounding licensing applications 
(for investment and for imports) became 
so complex that the large firms had a 
strong competitive advantage in satisfying 
license requirements: their share actually 
increased. In Turkey, import licenses were 
granted to establish assembly industries in 
the expectation that those (import-substi-
tution) industries would save foreign ex-
change and provide incentives for domestic 
production of parts and components. In-
stead, people invested in the assembly 
industries in order to earn import licenses, 
and the value of licenses for assembly 
industry requirements of intermediate 
goods increased, rather than decreased, 
during the 1960's, while domestic content 
requirements had to be employed to induce 
investments in parts-and-components pro-
ducing activities. 
Wide Variations in Economic Costs 
When producers know that they will 
benefit from complete protection from im-
ports once domestic productive capacity is 
established, there are powerful profitabil-
ity incentives to establish capacity regard-
less of the social opportunity costs of so 
doing. The drive to industrialize has been 
such an important goal that few of the 
countries covered in the Project have been 
able to resist using QR's to provide those 
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incentives. In India and Turkey, goods 
have simply become ineligible for importa-
tion once domestic productive capacity 
was established. In Egypt and Ghana, the 
same thing happened de facto. In Brazil, 
the Law of Similars, combined with do-
mestic content requirements, and a pro-
vision that tariff rates be doubled once 
domestic production started, achieved the 
same result. 
It is easily predictable that under such 
systems the variation in domestic resource 
cost among and within industries will be 
great. One of the purposes of the country 
studies was to quantify the extent of this 
variation, and the results show remarkably 
wide differences. We do not find that all 
import-substitution firms are inefficient. 
On the contrary, some appear to have very 
low costs while others require a large mul-
tiple of all resources in order to save an 
equal amount of foreign exchange. 
In view of this, a major defect of the QR 
system seems to be its inevitably indiscrim-
inate nature. If, within such a system, low-
cost activities could be differentially en-
couraged, the excess costs of the system 
should be significantly lower. Yet, the 
workings of the system seem invariably to 
result in an inability to reflect differentials 
in social profitability to individual de-
cision makers. 
Actual User Licensing 
We have already shown that the alloca-
tion of import licenses to firms using im-
ported goods in their production process 
has different resource-allocational implica-
tions from those that arise when premia on 
licenses accrue to individuals who then 
resell to actual users. One feature of most 
QR systems is that they have tended to 
become increasingly actual-user oriented, 
and the fraction of import licenses allo-
cated directly to user firms has increased 
over time. 
The motive for this method of alloca-
tion seems reasonable enough: it is de-
signed to avoid allowing large windfall 
gains to accrue to persons who apparently 
do nothing but apply for import licenses 
and, in addition, it rewards those indi-
viduals who have contributed toward the 
industrialization goal, as well as providing 
an implicit subsidy for recipient firms. 
Difficulty, however, arises from the fact 
that criteria for allocation of licenses 
among actual users are needed in the 
presence of excess demand. Without such 
criteria, the allocating officials are nat-
urally accused of favoritism. The most 
frequently adopted criterion has been to 
allocate licenses to recipients in proportion 
to different firms' capacities, although al-
most all countries have made provisions 
whereby new entrants would be entitled to 
an initial allocation. 
This allocational criterion has had two 
closely interrelated and deleterious side 
effects: (1) it has, predictably enough, en-
couraged the development of excess ca-
pacity, and (2) it has resulted in roughly 
proportionate expansion of all firms in a 
given industry with little competition be-
tween them. 
Turning to excess capacity first, in many 
newly established industries, firms' output 
levels are determined, within fairly narrow 
limits, by the volume of imports they ob-
tain. Hence, summing over firms within an 
industry, the industry's output is closely 
tied to the imports of intermediate goods 
allocated to it. The fact that there are ex-
cess profits to most firms at that level of 
output is reflected by the premium on im-
port licenses: any individual firm could in-
crease its total profit if it obtained more 
imports. 
The only way to get more imports, how-
ever, is to expand capacity, since one's 
import rights are a function of his share in 
total capacity of the industry. Thus, even 
with existing excess capacity, it may pay 
to build more, since the return on the in-
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vestment is the premium to be earned per 
unit of imports times the expected incre-
ment in import licenses. 
When policy makers perceive this result, 
a natural response is to attempt to control 
the expansion of capacity. Then, invest-
ment licensing follows import licensing. 
Again, criteria are needed and the circle 
has one more twist: profitability cannot be 
used as a criterion, since it emanates from 
import-licensing procedures, and also is 
regarded with suspicion (the bureaucrats 
are rewarding the already rich large firms). 
Thus, the natural temptation is to allow 
expansion proportionately over all appli-
cants or over all firms. Decisions about the 
relative rates at which different industries 
shall be expanded must then be made and 
private profitability departs further and 
further from social profitability. 
This brings us to the effect of import, 
and investment, licensing upon competi-
tion. For those industries where a firm's 
imports determine its output, the firm-
specific allocation of imports determines 
market shares. With output fixed in the 
short run, there is little competition among 
firms. If there were no investment licens-
ing, it might be that more profitable firms 
would expand more, with higher equilib-
rium levels of excess capacity in the long 
run. In general, however, investment 
licensing rules out even that form of com-
petition, perhaps diminishing excess ca-
pacity, but insuring the growth of efficient 
and inefficient firms alike. We spoke earlier 
of the asymmetries of export promotion 
and import substitution. It may well be 
that, in dynamic terms, the inability of 
QR systems to foster relatively more rapid 
growth of more efficient firms is one of the 
gravest drawbacks of the QR-import-sub-
stitution development pattern. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
We have only been able to scratch the 
surface of the results of the N BER project. 
Many of the statements we have made re-
quire, and indeed have, careful documen-
tation and elaboration. Moreover, there 
are numerous topics on which we have been 
unable to touch due to space limitations-
evidence on export responses to altered 
real exchange rates, macroeconomic con-
siderations in exchange-rate policy, many 
of the factors (such as effect on R&D) in-
volved in the trade-regime-growth interac-
tion, and the limits to QR regimes resulting 
from illicit transactions. 
